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Models of international unions suggest that large and rich countries reap little economic
beneﬁts from political integration with smaller and poorer countries. This paper challenges
this view by presenting a formal study of economic inﬂuence by special interest groups in an
international union. We ﬁrst show that countries where more groups are organized to lobby gain
from political integration on economic grounds. The reason is that a more organized country,
under a political union, can aﬀect policies in the other country to its advantage, something that
a less organized country can do to a lesser extent. We then argue that richer countries will
tend to have more organized interest groups before political integration and show that this will
continue to be the case afterward. Hence, the model implies that there are costs and beneﬁts
of EU Enlargement to Eastern Europe in addition to those suggested by the existing literature.
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EUI WP ECO 2004/301I n t r o d u c t i o n
After the achievement of a single currency, the European Union’s next leading project is the “big
bang” enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe. Thirteen applicants have been considered for
accession: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Of these countries, the ﬁrst ten are scheduled to enter
in May 2004. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania should be delayed until 2007 to allow them
more time to adopt the acquis communitaire, the 80,000 pages of EU rules and regulations that
entering countries need to undertake before joining the European Union.1
Contrary to previous instances of enlargement, the Eastern enlargement process will change
the face of the European Union. This is mainly for two reasons. First, incoming countries are much
poorer than the European Union. Their average per capita GDP in purchasing parity terms is
8,755 Euros against an average of 22,645 Euros for the European Union. Second, entering countries
have a population of 105 million people. Eastern enlargement will increase the size of the union’s
population by 20% and its GDP by only 5% (see ﬁgure 1).2 If we consider preferences over policies
to be somehow correlated with income, the current wave of enlargement will greatly alter, in a
short period of time, the political equilibrium of the European Union. If this is the case, how can
we explain Eastern enlargement?
A recent literature in political economy studies when it is convenient for countries to integrate
politically (i.e. to form - or enlarge - an international union) or to disintegrate into smaller national
entities.3 Models of political integration, such as Bolton and Roland (1997) and Persson and
Tabellini (2000), show that the beneﬁts from integration are inversely related to the size of a
country (its number of citizens) and to its income. The larger a country, the smaller the beneﬁt
from the economies of scale in the production of a common public good. On the other hand, the
richer a country, the larger the redistribution eﬀect (i.e. the amount of transfers to be made to the
poorer region).
More recently, Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2003) develop a model in which there is a tension
between the heterogeneity of individual countries’ preferences and the advantage of coordinating
public goods provision. In this setting, integration (or enlargement of an existing union) occurs
only when the loss of independent policymaking (i.e. the change in the median voter) is suﬃciently
small that it does not eliminate the gain from a rise in spillovers in public good provision.4
1Turkey has not been given a ﬁxed date of accession.
2Data are drawn from the Eurostat Yearbook (2002), are for the year 2000 and do not include Turkey.
3Early papers on the costs and beneﬁts of political integration are Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Casella and
Feinstein (1990). For a recent survey of this literature see Ruta (2003). Similar questions have been addressed by
the trade literature that deals with the political economy of regional free trade agreements (see for instance Baldwin,
1995) and by a large literature in political science (see Mattli, 1999).
4In the discussion that follows, enlargement can be thought of as the integration of an existing union with the
entering country or countries. Thus we use the two terms interchangeably.
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similar to current EU members - should be allowed to join the union. In other words, this political
economy approach seems to provide an incomplete explanation of the actual Eastern enlargement
process.
Some would argue that there are additional political reasons, such as stability in East and Cen-
tral Europe, or historical reasons that motivate enlargement. These are surely important factors,
but we believe there to be other economic implications of the East enlargement that the previous
literature has not stressed. In this paper we consider one overlooked channel created by lobbying
activity.
Interestingly, attitudes of special interest groups toward enlargement diﬀer between Eastern
and Western Europe. On the East side some groups, notably the lobby of farmers, oppose joining
the EU. On the West side several lobbies strongly favor enlargement: an editorial on the Financial
Times of November 2001 argued that “enlargement remains a priority for the elite, not the ordinary
voter.”5 How can we explain these opposing attitudes toward the East enlargement of the EU?
We present a formal study of economic inﬂuence by special interest groups in an international
union.6 We develop a framework that deals with the choice of integration of two regions or countries
in a setting in which there is a strategic interaction between interest groups and politicians both at
the domestic and at the international level. We consider two distinct regimes: political separation,
under which each government sets policy independently, and political integration, where a union
(or federal) government sets policy for the entire political union.
Available data suggest that far more special interest groups are active in the European Union
than in candidate countries. As can be seen in ﬁgure 1, the number of registered trade and
business associations is disproportionately larger in the EU relative to candidate countries (1,396
and 130 respectively).7 These data conﬁrm Olson’s intuition that, “stable societies with unchanged
boundaries tend to accumulate more collusion and organizations for collective action over time”.
We study how this diﬀerence in lobbying structure between current EU members and applicants
may aﬀect citizens’ preferences for political integration in Europe.
In our modeling strategy we borrow from the recent political economy literature on trade policy
(mainly Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and Mitra, 1999). However, as in Persson and Tabellini
(2000) we adapt the analysis to consider the provision of both global and local public goods. In
the ﬁrst part of the paper we give the main insights in a setting in which there is a given number
5As a matter of fact, even special interests that would be expected to oppose enlargement (such as labor unions)
did not do so.
6Ruta (2003) employs a similar model to show that lobbying can induce a misallocation of competencies between
diﬀerent levels of government in an international union. Cheikbossian (2001) studies rent-seeking activities in a union
in a more simpliﬁed setting where lobbies’ behavior is not microfounded. He ﬁn d st h a tl o b b y i n ge x p e n d i t u r e sa r e
increasing in international spillovers and in diﬀerences between member countries.
7The number of registered trade and business associations is admitedly a rough indicator. However, Greenwood
(2003) ﬁnds that 70% of registered EU level special interest groups are identiﬁed as ‘formal business associations’.
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integration itself could modify the lobbying structure of countries forming a union, in the second
part we show that these results carry over when the number of lobbies is endogenously determined.
We ﬁnd that both organized and unorganized groups in a more organized country (i.e. a
country with a higher share of lobbies to total population) receive more favorable policies under
integration than under separation, while the opposite occurs to groups in a less organized country.
The intuition of this result is that political integration, from the perspective of the more organized
country, reduces the level of competition among lobbies. The diﬀerence in lobbying structure
between the European Union and the accession countries favors organized EU groups, who can
inﬂuence policies in their favor to a larger extent, as well as the unorganized groups, because their
representation in an enlarged union is increased.
We then look at the welfare implications of political integration. We identify a new channel
created by lobbying activity. This is in addition to the two channels already studied in the literature:
redistribution and common provision of global public goods (or the internalization of international
spillovers). The “lobbying channel” of political integration has a positive welfare eﬀect for the more
organized country (i.e. the EU) and a negative one for the less organized (i.e. Eastern and Central
European countries). The overall decision on integration depends on the interplay between these
three eﬀects.
Endogenizing the number of lobbies provides new insights. First, we show that a country with
lower costs of organizing will have more active interest groups before political integration. We argue
that groups in the EU face lower costs of organization than those in Eastern Europe because more
advanced economies have better institutions and infrastructure. Second, we show that a change in
political regime aﬀects the incentives for collective action. Political integration reduces competition
for groups in the richer country and induces more groups to become organized. As in the exogenous
lobby case, unorganized and organized groups in the rich country receive more favorable policies
under integration, while the opposite occurs to groups in the poorer country.
An interesting implication of our analysis is that the existence of the lobbying eﬀect of political
integration implies that the loss of political independence from participating in an international
union is larger for Eastern and Central European countries than for existing EU members. There-
fore, as also suggested in Brou and Ruta (2003) and Wallner (2003), the beneﬁts for current EU
members and the costs for Eastern and Central European countries of EU enlargement might be
higher than those found in the existing empirical literature.8
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model with exogenous lobbies. In
section 3 we consider the case of endogenous lobby formation. Section 4 has concluding remarks.
Technical results and an extension of the model are presented in the appendices.
8See for example Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997).
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In the economy there are only two countries (or regions), A and B. The two countries have similar
political and economic environments, but they diﬀer in two respects: country A is richer, and it is
also more organized in the sense that it has a higher proportion of lobbies (organized groups that can
pay contributions to the government).9 There are two sets of public goods: local (or targeted) public
goods and global public goods. The ﬁr s th a v eo n l yf e wb e n e ﬁciaries, but their costs are dispersed
over the entire population. In accordance with the actual functioning of the European Union, we
allow for a very broad interpretation of these local public goods, including traditional targeted
policies such as direct transfers, but also less obvious policies like trade barriers, laws, regulations
and any other policy that can favor a particular group.10 The global public good beneﬁts every
citizen equally. Classic examples include defense, antitrust regulation and enforcement of the law.
Interest groups pay contributions in order to inﬂuence the political process to their advantage.
The two countries can choose to be politically integrated in an international union or to be
separated. Political integration implies that governments A and B cede the right to choose policy
to a supranational (i.e. federal) government.
W eb e g i nb yd e s c r i b i n gt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h e r eare no lobbies. This provides the benchmark
for the rest of the analysis. We then introduce the distinction between organized and non-organized
groups and derive equilibrium policies under separation and under union.
2.1 The benchmark: separation with no lobbies
In country i = A,B there is a set Mi of groups of individuals with measure mi.F o r s i m p l i c i t y
we assume that each group has the same size normalized to unity and that all individuals in the











+ F (Gi) (1)
where cj is consumption of the private good and gj is the local public good that beneﬁts each
individual belonging to group j. For simplicity we assume no externalities on other groups. The
function H (.) is increasing and concave.
G is a global public good. This public good is non rival and excludable across, but not within,
countries. If the two countries are separate, the global public good must be provided separately
in each country, foregoing the economies of scale associated with common provision. The function
F (.) is also increasing and concave.
9There are diﬀerent ways through which an interest group can inﬂuence the government. Contributions can be
i n t e r p r e t e de i t h e ra sc a m p a i g np a y m e n t so ra sl o b b y i n ge x p e n d i t u r e st op r o v i d ep o l i t i c a ls u p p o r tt ot h eg o v e r n m e n t .
10Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2002) ﬁnd that the involvement of the EU institutions in these policy areas
has largely increased in the past 30 years.
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individuals in the same country have the same income y
j
i = yi. T h i sa l l o w su st oa b s t r a c ta w a y
from issues arising from diﬀerences between groups and to focus on diﬀerences across countries.
Taxation is proportional and converting income into any of the j public goods is costless.































i is given by equation 1.












i is the equilibrium allocation vector of local public good provisions in the benchmark
case. Note that the marginal beneﬁt for each group equals the marginal social cost (of unity). With
a benevolent government each group receives the “amount” of targeted public good that gives to
t h eg r o u pt h es a m em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt as any other group. G∗
i is the equilibrium amount of the global
public good in the case of two separated political entities. Local and global public goods satisfy
the Samuelson condition that aggregate marginal beneﬁt equals the marginal cost of provision.
2.2 Separation with lobbies
Grossman and Helpman (1994) have developed a model of lobbying based on the menu auction
approach by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), which has been used to study trade as well as other
policies. Here we follow Persson and Tabellini (2000) in applying this framework to local public
goods.12
11See Alesina, Angeloni, Etro (2003) for a model with heterogeneity in preferences.
12The Grossman-Helpman (1994) approach deals with the incentives of lobbies to inﬂuence the government. A
large part of the literature on lobbying focuses instead on the incentives of special interests to gather information
and provide it to the policy maker. For a recent discussion of both approaches see Grossman and Helpman (2001).
In this paper we do not consider the informational role of lobbies.
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to inﬂuence the government to their advantage and that the government is “semi-benevolent” in
the sense that it gives some weight to the general interest, but can also be inﬂuenced by lobbies
through contributions. Moreover, we assume that under political separation lobbies in one country
cannot inﬂuence policies in the other country.13
The game has two stages:
1. Every lobby j,w i t hj ∈ Ni, non cooperatively and simultaneously presents a contribution
schedule C
j
i (gi,G i) to the government, giving a binding promise of payment conditional on the
chosen policy.













i (gi,G i)dj (6)
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is a measure of government benevolence.14












i (gi,G i)dj (7)
In other words, the equilibrium coincides with the solution to a planning problem in which the
non-organized groups receive a lower weight than the organized ones to an extent that depends on
the government’s benevolence.






idj + Gi (8)
Where ti is the proportional tax rate. Contributions do not enter the government budget
constraint. We could interpret this in one of two ways: the contributions are strictly for private
consumption of the politicians or they are simply redistributed in a lump sum fashion to all citizens.
13This is a standard assumption, see for example Grossman and Helpman (1995). Allowing foreign lobbies to aﬀect
the home government would not change the nature of our results, provided that it is easier for home special interests
to lobby the home government than for foreign groups. There are several reasons why this might be the case. First,
politicians often view gifts from foreign sources as a sort of tainted money. Second, foreign lobbies have weaker
connections with the government, the bureaucrats and the media.
14We consider the measure of government benevolence to be the same for each country. We discuss this point later.
15For now we assume that such an equilibrium exists. In appendix 2 we show that the conditions that we derive
under this assumption constitute necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium.
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ing that c
j
i =( 1− ti)yi, we can substitute it directly into the utility function of the representative
agent in group j:
W
j















+ F (Gi) (9)
Substituting this expression into equation 7 and maximizing we obtain the ﬁrst-order condi-







− 1=−(1 − λi)(1− η) ≤ 0 (10)







− 1=λi (1 − η)/η ≥ 0 (11)












On the left-hand side of the ﬁrst-order conditions we have the utilitarian benchmark derived in
the previous subsection, therefore the right-hand side measures deviations from the social optimum.
Two results can be drawn. First, groups that can pay contributions receive more and unorganized
groups receive less of the local public goods relative to the social optimum, e gL
i >g ∗
i > e gN
i .16 Second,
lobbying activity does not aﬀect the provision of the global public good. Lobbies have no incentive
to inﬂuence the government’s provision of G since it coincides with their optimal choice and there
is no conﬂict between diﬀerent groups on the provision of the global public good.
2.3 Political integration
In this section we study the equilibrium policies that emerge in a union with a politically motivated
government. In the union there is a set M = MA ∪ MB of groups with measure m = mA + mB.
Again, we deﬁne the share of organized groups in A as λA = nA
mA and similarly for country B,
λB = nB
mB.
We assume that countries A and B have diﬀerent income levels. Country A is richer than B,
yA >y B. Taxation in the union is proportional and converting income into any public good is
costless.












and the assumptions on H(.).
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share of organized groups (i.e. groups that pay contributions) when compared to country B. Rough
data for the European Union and Eastern European countries support this assumption (see Figure
1). There are several reasons why this is the case. First of all, as we will show in section 3, this
may be the result of the fact that a more developed country has better organizational abilities (or
a better technology for collective action) because, for instance, it has more advanced institutions
and better infrastructure. This provides a reason why it is easier in a more advanced economy
to overcome the problems related to the formation of an organized group and motivates Olson’s
intuition as stated in the introduction. A related argument is historical and speciﬁct oE u r o p e .
Most of the entering countries are former socialist states. As such, democratic institutions are more
recent and agents are less familiar with the process of lobbying. Special interests are less likely to
have realized the beneﬁts of collective action and face higher costs of becoming organized. The third
argument is related to Krugman (1979). A richer economy will have a larger variety of sectors than
a poorer economy. If this is the case, for a given population, each sector will have a smaller size in
the richer country and will ﬁnd it easier to overcome the free-riding problem associated with lobby
formation (Olson,1965).17 A fourth argument comes from Mitra (1999). He shows that groups
that have large capital stocks, face inelastic demand, and have a small number of members are
more likely to get organized. All of these characteristics are typical of a more developed industrial
economy.
Under political integration, lobbies in country A and B can inﬂuence policiy by lobbying the
“semi-benevolent” union government. The problem the union government faces is the following:
max
gU,GU
WU = WA + WB (13)
subject to





Udj + GU (14)
where Wi with i = A,B i sg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n7a n dgU is the vector of local public goods under
union.











where we deﬁne y ≡
mAyA+mByB
m .
Using the union tax rate, the indirect utility of group j in country i is given by:
17We thank Stanislaw Wellisz for highlighting this point.
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+ F (GU) (16)







− 1=−(1 − λU)(1− η) ≤ 0 (17)







− 1=λU (1 − η)/η ≥ 0 (18)










my λB is a weighted average of each country’s λ, where the weights
depend on a country’s relative size mi
m and its relative income
yi
y .
We want to compare how the provision of public goods changes in the case of the formation
of an international union between country A and B.18
Proposition 1 (i)The provision of the global public good increases under integration.(ii) Both
organized and non-organized groups in the richer country (i.e. the country with a higher portion
of lobbies) receive more of the targeted public good under union than under separation. (iii) The
opposite occurs to organized and non-organized groups in the poorer country (i.e. the country with
a lower share of lobbies).
Intuitively, the provision of the global public good is increased under union because the social
beneﬁt is larger, due to the increase in population, while the social cost remains the same.
To grasp the intuition of results (ii) and (iii), note that the eﬀectiveness of lobbying is a
decreasing function of the share of groups that are organized, λ.19 When this share is low, there is
less competition among lobbies and each one is better able to aﬀect policies in its favor. Unorganized
groups also receive more favorable policies because they become a more important part of the
aggregate (social) welfare function and the government weights their interests more heavily. For
the more organized country, joining the union decreases the share of lobbies in total population
(λA >λ U), while the opposite happens for the poor and less organized country (λB <λ U).20
18All proofs are in Appendix 1.










20This result is sensitive to the assumption that government benevolence in the two countries is the same and that
the formation of an international union is not going to aﬀect the benevolence parameter, η. We use this assumption
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policies in the other country under uniﬁcation to a larger extent. Special interests in the less
organized country can also aﬀect policies in the rich country in a political union. However, since
they face tougher competition under union (λ increases), lobbies in the poor country are less
eﬀective under integration than under separation.
2.4 Political integration and welfare
Having discussed the characteristics of policies in the political equilibria under separation and
integration, we now turn our attention to the choice between these outcomes.21
Consider ﬁrst the change in welfare of a non organized group of country i when that country
moves toward political integration
∆N
i = f WN
iU − f WN
iS










iS − e CiS
´
where e CiU and e CiS represent equilibrium contributions under integration and separation, re-
spectively. Equilibrium contributions are derived in the appendix.22
































































e tU − e tiS
¢¤
(21)
The change in either group’s welfare consists of three diﬀerent eﬀects, represented by the three
bracketed terms in the above equations. We refer to the ﬁrst as the “lobbying eﬀect of political
integration”, the second is the gain from centralized provision of the global public good and the
third component is the redistribution eﬀect, which captures the change in the total cost of providing
public goods as well as the redistributive eﬀect implied by proportional taxation.
because of a lack of empirical evidence on such a measure. If we use corruption as a proxy of non-benevolence, poorer
countries, which tend to have more corrupt governments, should have a lower η. In this case, if the union government
has a measure of benevolence anywhere in between the two countries’ benevolence rate, the result in proposition 1
holds.
21We assume that lobbies do not aﬀect the political decision of integration. Our analysis focuses on a new channel
- created by lobbying on policies - through which political integration aﬀects welfare. For a model where lobbies
directly aﬀect the choice of regimes see Faia and Ruta (2003) and Ruta (2003).
22Following Laussel and Le Breton (2001) it can be shown that the vector of equilibrium contributions is unique
for commonly used utility functions (e.g. Logarithmic, Cobb-Douglas, CIES) when η is not very small.
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groups) and contributions (for lobbies). The sign of the lobbying eﬀect is derived in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 T h el o b b y i n ge ﬀect of political integration is positive for the rich and more orga-
nized country and negative for the poor and less organized country.
A formal proof can be found in the Appendix, here we discuss the intuition. Under political
integration the distortion in the provision of targeted public goods, as was established in the
previous subsection, favors individuals in the more organized country. Therefore the lobbying
eﬀect of political integration is positive (negative) for non-organized groups in the more (less)
organized country. The lobbying eﬀect for special interests (equation 21) depends also on the
change in equilibrium contributions. We show that the increase in welfare due to an increase in
targeted public goods provision for lobbies in the rich country more than compensates the change
in equilibrium contributions (and viceversa for lobbies in the poor country).
The global public good eﬀect is always positive since it is strictly an economies of scale eﬀect.
All groups beneﬁt from a greater population under political union.
The redistribution eﬀect is theoretically ambiguous, being a function of the λ’s and the y’s.
However, it is likely to beneﬁt the poorer country as any increased cost of public good provision will
be borne largely by the richer country. The larger the disparity in income across the two countries
(or regions), the more likely that this eﬀe c tw i l lb ep o s i t i v ef o ri n d i v i d u a l si nt h ep o o r e rc o u n t r y . 23
The two latter eﬀects are the ones traditionally highlighted in the literature - the economies
of scale in the global public good provision and the redistribution eﬀect, respectively. In the case
of the European Union Eastern enlargement, it is not clear if economies of scale will compensate
existing EU members for the required redistribution. We argue that the new channel we introduce
- the lobbying eﬀect - helps to explain the move toward enlargement in the EU as well as rising
complaints from some special interests in Eastern Europe. As in the previous literature, overall
preferences on political integration are shaped by the relative strength of the diﬀerent channels
through which political integration aﬀects welfare.
23Thus far we have assumed that governments are always able to collect enough in tax revenues in order to provide
the optimal level of public goods (both local and global). That is, in the government maximization problem under
separation, the additional constraint ti ≤ 1 is not binding. This need not always be the case for poorer economies.
How does this assumption aﬀect our results? Poorer countries would face an additional beneﬁtf r o mi n t e g r a t i o n
because their budget constraint would be loosened: public goods that are too expansive to provide under separation
can be provided under integration.
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Until now we have assumed that the number of lobbies is constant and exogenous. We now consider
an extension of the model where the number of lobbies is endogenously determined. The reason for
this exercise is that groups that were unorganized under separation could ﬁnd it convenient to get
organized and lobby the government once the union is formed. In other words, political integration
itself could modify the lobbying structure of countries forming a union and bring into question
previous results.
More speciﬁcally, in this section we address three questions. What determines the equilibrium
number of lobbies in each country? Does political integration modify the incentives of interest
groups to organize? How does lobby formation inﬂuence equilibrium policies and welfare in an
international union?
We ﬁrst present a model of endogenous lobbying and derive the equilibrium number of lobbies
under political separation. We argue that a more advanced economy has a higher degree of collusion.
We then study how political integration aﬀects the lobbying structure of each country and of the
union as a whole.
3.1 Equilibrium lobbies under political separation
In this subsection we study the decision of an unorganized group to form a lobby under political
separation. Following Mitra (1999) we model the decision to become organized as a simple entry
game where agents with common interests weigh the beneﬁts of aﬀecting policy in their favor
against the cost of becoming organized.
-Each group faces a ﬁxed cost of becoming organized. In choosing whether to incur this ﬁxed
cost, the nth group considers its welfare if organized relative to its welfare if it is not. If the beneﬁt
of becoming organized - net of contributions - is greater than the ﬁxed cost, the group will choose to
become organized. The game is solved by backward induction, where the outcome of the last stage
is given by our previous results. As we saw in section 2, the policies chosen in equilibrium depend
on the fraction of the population that is organized, i.e. on the fraction of groups that choose to
form a lobby, λi = ni
mi.
Deﬁne the gross and the net beneﬁt of forming a lobby, respectively, as24
GB (λ)=f WL (λ) − f WN (λ) (22)
NB(λ)=f WL (λ) − f WN (λ) − e C (λ) (23)
24For now we consider the equilibrium in a single country and drop the country index.
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group when a subset of groups of mass n are organized but all other groups are not.25 Clearly,
NB(λ)=GB (λ) − e C (λ).
Let F(j) denote the ﬁxed cost of getting organized for group j.T h e s eﬁxed costs can depend
on a number of factors. There is heterogeneity across groups within a country because groups
diﬀer in their organizational ability. Heterogeneity across countries is likely to arise as a result
of diﬀerences in infrastructure (e.g. communications) and/or political institutions. Thus, even if
countries have the same distribution of organizational abilities, the cost of becoming organized will
be higher for those groups in the countries with poor infrastructure and institutions.
Let groups be ranked and indexed in ascending order of their ﬁxed costs such that F0 (λ) > 0.
Ag r o u pn will choose to become organized under the following condition:26
f WL (λ) − f WN (λ) − e C (λ) >F(λ) (24)
It can be shown that if NB0(λ) <F 0(λ), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and it is












= F(b λ),w h e r eb λ = e n
m.27 In this
equilibrium, all groups with ﬁxed cost less than F(b λ) are organized.
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where e gL (λ) and e gN (λ) are the equilibrium levels of local public good provision under separa-
tion to organized and non organized groups, respectively, and e G is the equilibrium provision of the
global public good. They are implicitly determined by the ﬁrst-order conditions of the appropriate
government maximization problem.
Using the deﬁnition of the gross beneﬁt and equations 25 and 26 we have:
25Note that we explicitly write the gross beneﬁt and contributions as functions of the share of the population that
is organized, λ. That the gross beneﬁt depends only on λ is apparent from equation 22. In appendix 1, we formally
derive equilibrium contributions and show that they also depend only on λ. Intuitively, this is the case because
with truthful contributions, a newly formed lobby must compensate the government for any resulting reduction in
its welfare. Since the new lobby does not aﬀect the provision of the global public good, any reduction in government
welfare must come about through the new lobby’s eﬀect on the local public good, but this depends entirely on λ.
26Mitra (1999) provides a more detailed discussion of this point. Essentially, we assume that groups can costlessly
overcome the free-rider problem. As long as the group as a whole is better oﬀ by becoming organized, the members
will be able to coordinate the payment of the ﬁxed cost.
27We restrict our analysis to the more interesting case of an interior solution, e n ∈ (0,m).
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e gL (λ) − e gN (λ)
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e gL (λ) − e gN (λ)
¤
(29)
In the following lemma we prove that, if the government is semi benevolent (η<1) the net
beneﬁt is positive. Even if special interests are competing, the government cannot extract all the
surplus that lobbies stand to gain from the agency game as in Dixit, Grossman and Helpman
(1997). The reason is that in our model the tax rate (and therefore the budget) is residually
determined after the decision on public goods provision has been taken. Therefore, changing the
policy instrument creates distortions: altering the provision of targeted public goods for diﬀerent
groups induces a change in the tax rate (and therefore a change in net income) that distorts the
optimal consumption of the public versus private good. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and
Mitra (1999), when the policy instrument creates distortions, a semi benevolent government is
disinclined to use it to extremes. This allows competing special interests to obtain positive rents
from the lobbying game.28
Lemma 3 NB(λ) > 0 for all η ∈ [0,1).
We show next that the net beneﬁt of forming a lobby is a decreasing function of the share of












The ﬁrst term represents the decrease in the net beneﬁt due to the increased tax burden. This
term is negative because e gL (λ) > e gN (λ). The second term represents the opportunity cost of a





Hgg(h gN) < 0 because Hgg (g) < 0 by assumption. It follows that the second term is
positive. In the following lemma we show that the ﬁrst term dominates the second for all possible
28When the budget is ﬁxed (i.e. in a pure redistribution game), competing lobbies get no extra beneﬁtf r o ml o b b y i n g
activity compared to non organized groups. Details can be found in proposition 5 and the ensuing discussion in Dixit,
Grossman and Helpman (1997).
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there are more organized groups working against each other and a smaller unorganized population
to exploit. Therefore the net beneﬁt from forming a lobby is decreasing in the existing number of
lobbies. Formally, we have:
Lemma 4 NB0(λ) ≤ 0 for all η ∈ [0,1].
As a direct consequence of the lemma and the fact that by assumption F (λ) is increasing




) that is determined
endogenously.
The smaller the ﬁxed cost of getting organized for each group (i.e. the more the F schedule
shifts down), the larger is the number of organized groups. Fixed costs will diﬀer across countries
because of diﬀerences in infrastructure and/or institutions and the cost of becoming organized will
be higher for those groups in less developed countries. As a consequence, the equilibrium under
separation implies that the share of lobbies over total population in country A, the richer and more
developed country, is larger than in country B, b λ
S
A > b λ
S
B (See ﬁgure 2).
3.2 Equilibrium lobbies under political integration
We turn now to study the interaction of political integration and lobby formation. More speciﬁcally,
we focus on how political integration aﬀects the equilibrium number of lobbies in each country and
how this change inﬂuences equilibrium policies.
We assume that the equilibrium lobbying structure of the two countries under separation
represents the status quo. This means that the choice of group formation under separation occurred
some time in the past when interest groups could not foresee the possibility of political integration.
Once the international union is formed, groups that were not organized in the separation regime
may decide to form an active lobby in the new political environment.
We choose to have a “historical” number of organized groups in this section because we feel
that it more closely reﬂects the European experience. Before the collapse of the socialist regimes in
the late 80s and early 90s, strictly geopolitical reasons made it impossible to think about Eastern
enlargement of the EU. From the perspective of groups that faced organizational decisions in the
Cold War era, political integration between Western and Eastern Europe came as a fully unexpected
event.29
The timing has the following four stages:
1. Each country decides to integrate or maintain political independence.
29In order to take into account experiences diﬀerent from the EU East enlargement process, we consider the
alternative scenario where all groups simultaneously face the organization decision under political union in appendix
3. We show that this alternative timing of events leads to similar results.
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ganized in the new political jurisdiction. Organized groups, that have already paid the ﬁxed cost
of becoming organized under separation remain that way (i.e. we assume no lobby destruction).
3. Every lobby non cooperatively and simultaneously presents the union government with a
contribution schedule.
4. The union government chooses policies for the entire union so as to maximize a weighted
sum of social welfare and contributions.
Consider how the incentives of (unorganized) groups to become organized are aﬀected by a
political union. Initially, the (weighted-average) proportion of the population that is organized in













so that b λ
S
A >λ o
U > b λ
S
B.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t NB(λo




A), and that there
are unorganized groups in country A that ﬁnd it worthwhile to become organized under a political
union. It is also true that NB(λo




B), and no unorganized group in country B
ﬁnds it worthwhile to become organized. We assume that once a group is organized to aﬀect national
policy it can also aﬀect union policy so that no organized group in B chooses to disband.30 As








up along the FA schedule and down the NB schedule. This will continue until the equilibrium
condition NB(b λU)=FA(b λ
U
A) is satisﬁed. The exact value of b λU will depend on the shapes of these




A]. The main results are summarized
in the following proposition.31
Proposition 5 Political integration induces: (i) An increase in the equilibrium number of lobbies
in the richer country but no increase in the equilibrium number of lobbies in the poorer country.
(ii) An increase in equilibrium targeted public good provision for both organized and non-organized
groups in the richer country. (iii) A decrease in equilibrium targeted public good provision for both
organized and non-organized groups in the poorer country.
To grasp the intuition of this result we need to focus on how political integration aﬀects lobby-
ing activity. New lobbies are formed in the rich and (historically) more organized country because
30This seems to be a plausible assumption. As indirect evidence, note that most national special interests with a
stake in EU policy have an oﬃce in Brussel in addition to their national headquarters. The results, however, do not
depend on this assumption.
31The assumption that previously formed lobbies in country B do not disband does not alter the results. If we
allow for lobby “destruction”, organized groups in B would become unorganized as groups in A become organized.




B).I tc a nb es h o w nt h a te λ
S
A > e λU > e λ
S
B still
holds and the same qualitative results follow.
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reduces eﬀective competition between special interests and increases the net beneﬁt of becoming
organized.
Lobby formation in country A increases the amount of competition in the political union
compared to the initial proportion of the population that is organized in the union (b λU >λ o
U).
However, in equilibrium the share of lobbies over total population in the union is still lower than
in country A in the separation regime (b λU < b λ
S
A). Qualitatively, the eﬀect of political integration
is not changed by allowing for endogenous lobby formation. Although new lobbies are formed,
the country that would be more organized before integration is still the one that beneﬁts from
integration because competition among lobbies is lower relative to the case of separation. The
opposite is also still true for the country that would be less organized..
3.3 Discussion: political integration, lobby formation and welfare
In this subsection we turn to welfare analysis. We focus on the “lobbying eﬀect of political inte-
gration.” In the case of endogenous entry of lobbies, political union beneﬁts the citizens of the rich
country in two ways. Firstly, more groups choose to become organized and lobby the government
for preferential treatment. Secondly, as in the exogenous lobby case, the decrease in competition
allows organized groups to receive more of the local public good at a lower cost to the unorganized
groups.
We can separate the groups in the rich country into three categories: those that are organized
under both separation and union; those that are not organized under either regime; and those
that only become organized under a political union. The ﬁrst two groups, as in the exogenous
case, beneﬁt from a political union simply because the resulting fall in λ increases the amount of
targeted public good they receive. The third group beneﬁts further from the fact that they become
organized and can inﬂuence the government to their advantage.
Groups in the poor country, as in the exogenous case, loose from a political union because
the resulting increase in λ reduces the amount of public good they receive. However, the lobbying
eﬀect of political integration is now larger because the amount of competition in the union is larger
than in the case of exogenous lobbying. The decision of whether to join the union then depends on
t h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h i se ﬀect and the other channels through which political integration inﬂuences
welfare.
The analysis of special interest politics in an international union highlights an interesting aspect
of the Eastern European enlargement - and more generally of political integration - neglected by the
existing literature. Forming a union implies a loss of political independence for each country. Our
results show that this problem might be particularly relevant for Eastern European countries and
less important for countries already in the European Union. The reason is related to the diﬀerent
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integration implies a change of the median voter equilibrium. Assuming that the two countries
have equal size, this change would be fully symmetric and the loss of political independence would
be equal for the two nations. Instead, in our model lobbies aﬀect policies in their favor. Therefore,
the higher the number of organized groups in a country, the larger is the extent to which that
country is able to inﬂuence the political process of the union and the smaller is the loss of political
independence. This fact also helps to rationalize the fears of Eastern European nations that their
interests will be neglected in an enlarged union.
As this section shows, political integration induces previously unorganized groups in the richer
country to get organized and lobby. As a consequence, lobby formation in the European Union will
increase the cost of losing political independence for entering countries.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The main results of this research have been already highlighted in the introduction. We would like
to conclude with some comments and by stressing some avenues for future research.
Is this setting realistic? Our main assumption is that countries in the European Union are more
organized than Eastern and Central European nations, in the sense that in the European Union a
higher fraction of people has its interests somehow represented by lobbies. As argued in the paper,
there are several theoretical reasons why this should be the case. Countries with higher GDP are
generally characterized by those factors that the recent literature on interest groups has pointed
as being key determinants of groups formation: better organizational abilities, higher varieties
of sectors (and therefore smaller number of members in each sector), the presence of industries
with large capital stocks and/or industries that face more inelastic demands. These theoretical
arguments motivate Olson’s idea that collective action will become more widespread over time in
stable democracies. Unfortunately this assumption is diﬃcult to verify empirically. However, if we
consider formal business associations as a rough measure of lobby participation in a given country,
interest groups in the current European Union are likely to be more represented in an enlarged
union.
One could still doubt the relevance of the eﬀects of lobbying activity on political integration
identiﬁed in this paper. However, looking at the functioning of the European Union, it is diﬃcult
to think that the only economic beneﬁt for a rich country coming from integration is the joint pro-
duction of common public goods or from coordination of public good provisions. Recent historical
accounts of the European integration process (Moravcsik, 1998) and studies by political scientists
(Greenwood, 2003) highlight the role of special interest politics in inﬂuencing policies and regu-
lations in the EU. Let’s consider how the lobbying eﬀect could work in practice. The European
Union is, among other things, a regional trade agreement, with no internal tariﬀsa n dac o m m o n
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trade policies, while in the case of integration they have to undertake the decision agreed with the
other European countries. EU organized groups, mainly the lobby of exporters, ﬁnd it diﬃcult to
inﬂuence trade policy decisions in Eastern European countries, but they would be better able to
inﬂuence these decisions to their advantage in an enlarged union.32
Moreover, the European Union has a set of laws that regulate its internal market. This might
give another advantage to EU interest groups. Think, for example, of environmental regulation:
a lobby of ﬁrms can inﬂuence what kind of regulation the union can adopt and can push toward
rules that favor its technology, but cannot inﬂuence legislation in a foreign country. Once Eastern
European countries are inside the union they will have to undertake that regulation, making the
expansion of current EU ﬁrms into Eastern European markets easier. As tariﬀ barriers decrease,
special interest groups will turn their attention to these ‘non-tariﬀ’ barriers as a way to protect
their interests.
We believe that a deeper understanding of how special interest politics inﬂuences institutions
(in a broad sense as constitutional rules, laws, political borders, etc.) is an interesting area of
research. Future work on lobbying and political integration will have to deal with the empirical
relevance of the role played by interest groups in an international union and more in general in
international organizations. On the other hand, theoretical models should also consider some issues
that we have ignored for the sake of simplicity. What happens when lobbies in the same country
have conﬂicting interests over integration? How would our results change if groups with similar
interests choose to form international lobbies?
32The important role played by interest groups in aﬀecting trade policy has been largely studied. For a survey of
empirical works in this area see Gawande and Krishna (Forthcoming).
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In this appendix we provide the proof of the results in the main text.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Compare the ﬁrst order conditions under separation (equations 10 to 12) and integration
(equations 17 to 19). Result (i) is immediate. Results (ii) and (iii) follow from λA >λ U >λ B.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We ﬁrst derive equilibrium contributions and then we show that the “lobbying eﬀect of political
integration” (i.e. the ﬁrst bracketed term in equations 20 and 21) is positive (negative) for groups
in the more (less) organized country.
A. Equilibrium contributions
As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), we consider only truthful contributions, that are given
by:33
C = WL − b (31)
where b is the net of contributions welfare of an organized group.
In order to calculate equilibrium contributions by a lobby, we follow Mitra (1999) by asking
what will happen if a small number of organized groups, of measure ∆n, decides do defect. Using
equation 6, the national government welfare in equilibrium is given by
f WGOV (n)=η
³
nf WL (n)+( m − n) f WN (n)
´
+( 1− η)ne C
≡ ηf WA (n)+( 1− η)n
h
f WL (n) −e b
i
(32)
where f WA is aggregate welfare (gross of contributions) and where we make explicit that the
welfare of groups and the aggregate welfare (net of contributions) are a function of n. However, if
a number of lobbies of measure ∆n deviates, the government’s welfare changes to:
f WGOV (n − ∆n)=η(n − ∆n)f WA (n − ∆n)+( 1− η)(n − ∆n)
h
f WL (n − ∆n) −e b
i
(33)
33See Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a detailed discussion of truthful
strategies. An equilibrium in truthful strategies has the property that all contribution schedules, when positive, have
a slope that is equal to the marginal beneﬁtf o rt h el o b b y .
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the limit for ∆n → 0 we get the net of contribution equilibrium welfare for lobby j:
e b(n)=f WL (n)+nf WL ´(n)+
η
1 − η
f WA ´(n) (34)









The above expression means that the equilibrium contribution level by an organized sector
compensates for the reduction in the gross welfare of the other existing organized groups and the
reduction in the overall social welfare brought about by the formation of that organized group.
e C (n) can be rewritten as:
e C (n)=WL (n) − e V´(n) (36)
where e V (n)=nf WL (n)+
η
1−ηf WA (n).N o t et h a t
e V (n)=V
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The economic interpretation of this equation is the following. Recall that equilibrium contri-
butions compensate for the reduction in overall gross welfare. The ﬁrst term represents the increase
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organized groups: each of the n lobbies has to pay a share 1
m of the increase in tax expenditures
due to the formation of the new group.34 Similarly, the third term represents the decrease in social
welfare due to the increased tax burden. Note that in our benchmark case, the utilitarian equi-
librium implied e gL = e gN = g∗, therefore the greater the diﬀerence between the two policies, the
larger is the distortion and accordingly the higher equilibrium contributions need to be.








and that n enters the
functions e gL (.) and e gN (.) only through n
m ≡ λ. Therefore, equilibrium contributions can be written
as a function of the share of groups that is organized (as in equation 28 in the main text).
Furthermore, by following the same procedure we ﬁnd that contribution functions take the
same form for lobbies from both countries under political union. The only diﬀerence is that λ = n
m




my λB. In both equilibria, contribution schedules depend on para-
meters of interest only through their eﬀect on λ. This is intuitive because equilibrium contributions
in the Grossman and Helpman framework compensate the government for the reduction in welfare
due to lobbying activity (i.e. for the change of local public good provision and not for the change
in the common public good provision).
B. Sign of the lobbying eﬀect of political integration
1. Non organized groups
We need to show that the term in the ﬁrst bracket of condition 20 is positive (negative) for non
organized groups in the more (less) organized country. This is equivalent to showing that H
¡
e gN¢






=[ ( 1− λ)η + λ]
de gN
dλ





Hgg(.) < 0 which proves the result.
2. Lobbies
We show that the “lobbying eﬀect of political integration” is positive (negative) for lobbies in









The ﬁrst term in the last inequality is given by
34The increase in tax expenditures is a consequence of the increase of targeted public good provision for the new
group from h g
N to h g
L.
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Taking the ﬁrst derivative of equation 41 with respect to the fraction of organized citizens, λ,





































e gL − e gN¢




The result simply follows by substituting equations 43 and 45 into condition 42 and recalling
that e gL > e gN.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3







e gL − e gN >η+ λ(1 − η)




= η + λ(1 − η) <
1
η
[η + λ(1 − η)] = Hg
¡
e gN¢
So that the assumption Hgg < 0 implies that
i) e gL > e gN
ii) η + λ(1 − η) <H g (x) < 1
η [η + λ(1 − η)] ∀x ∈
¡
e gL,e gN¢









e gL − e gN = Hg (ξ)
B yt h ea b o v ep o i n ti i ) ,w eh a v et h a tHg (ξ) >η+ λ(1 − η).S ot h a tNB(λ) > 0.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4
Remember that NB ´(λ)=−
¡







We ﬁrst consider the extreme cases.
Case 1: Full government benevolence (η =1 )
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Case 2: Government only cares about contributions (η =0 )
In this case, lim
η→0











However, when we restrict preferences to commonly used utility functions (e.g. Loga-
rithmic, Cobb-Douglas, CIES), it can be shown that lim
η→0
NB0(λ) is always determined and negative.
























The ﬁr s tt e r mi sa l w a y sp o s i t i v e .
For the same group of commonly used functions, the second term is also positive and always
dominates the last (negative) term. Thus we have that NB0(λ) ≤ 0 for all η ≤ 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
The discussion in the main text establishes result (i). In order to prove results (ii) and (iii)
we need only prove that b λ
S
A > b λU > b λ
S
B. Suppose that this is not the case. First, consider the case
when b λU > b λ
S




A) <F A(b λ
U
A), which contradicts
the equilibrium condition. Similarly, if b λU < b λ
S
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There is no general proof for the existence of an equilibrium in a common agency game with
a continuum of principals. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that such an equilibrium exists
i nt h ec a s eo faﬁnite number of principals. Here we prove that the conditions derived in the main
text are necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium where all organized lobbies oﬀer
a contribution schedule that requires a positive contribution. We do so by showing that the agent
(i.e. the government) and the principals (i.e. the lobbies) have no incentive to deviate from this
equilibrium.
1. Lobbies
We begin by showing that none of the lobbies (principals) have an incentive to deviate from
the speciﬁed actions. Speciﬁcally, this entails showing that any lobby cannot be made better oﬀ by
oﬀering a zero contribution (eﬀectively acting as a non-organized group).
Suppose the opposite is true and that an active lobby ﬁnds it proﬁtable to abstain from
oﬀering contributions. Since there is a continuum of groups, each lobby is of measure zero and its
deviation does not aﬀect the share of the population that remains organized, λ. Consequently, the
government does not alter the quantity of targeted public goods that it gives to either organized
lobbies or non-organized groups (e gL and e gN, respectively). The reason is that the equilibrium
targeted public goods provision only depends on λ. Similarly, the deviation of a lobby does not
change equilibrium contributions e C (see appendix 1).
The deviating lobby now receives e gN instead of e gL. This implies a gross payoﬀ of f WN as
opposed to f WL. Moreover, the lobby no longer has to pay contributions e C. The change in net
payoﬀ to this group is given by f WN−f WL+ e C = −NB where the net beneﬁti sg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n2 9
in the main text. Lemma 3 shows that for η<1 the net beneﬁt is positive. This is a contradiction
because it implies that the deviating lobby incurs in a welfare loss.
2. Government
It is straight-forward to show that the government (the agent in this common-agency set-up)
will not deviate. This follows directly from the fact that
(e g, e G) = argmax
(g,G)
£
η(m − n)WN + nWL¤
=a r gm a x
(g,G)
WGOV (46)
where WGOV is given by equation 6 and the last equality follows from the fact that we consider
an equilibrium in truthful strategies.
More precisely, from the last term in equation 46, e g must be such that
η
£
(m − n)WN (e g)+nWL (e g)
¤
+( 1− η)ne C>η
£
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From the deﬁnition of the contribution function (equation 31), we have that e C = WL (e g) −e b.
This implies that C>W L (g)−e b. Substituting into the last inequality and simplifying, we obtain
the ﬁrst term in condition 46.
29
A Positive Explanation of EU Enlargement
EUI WP ECO 2004/30Appendix 3
We return to the interaction of political integration and lobby formation under a diﬀerent
assumption on the timing of the game. We focus on how political integration determines the
equilibrium number of lobbies in the two countries and how this aﬀects equilibrium policies, lobby
formation and welfare.
In the present exposition, all groups decide simultaneously whether or not to organize into
formal lobbies. The key diﬀerence with the model discussed in section 3.2 is that there is no status
quo number of previously organized lobbies. A possible interpretation is that the current case
assumes that all groups fully expect the possibility of a political union, while the previous case
allows for lobby formation before the possibility of a political union is considered. Formally, the
timing is as follows. At an initial stage each country decides to integrate or to remain politically
independent. If one of the two countries does not accept integration, the game reverts to the one
presented in section 3.2. If a political union is formed, at the second stage groups in each country
decide whether to form a lobby or to remain unorganized. At the third stage, every lobby non-
cooperatively and simultaneously presents the union government with a contribution schedule. At
the ﬁnal stage, the union government sets policy for the entire union so as to maximize a weighted
sum of social welfare and contributions.
The game under a political union is thus similar to the one under separation except that
all groups in both countries must now simultaneously decide if it is worthwhile to inﬂuence the
union government. As before we solve the game using backward induction. The ﬁnal stage under
political integration is the same as in the exogenous lobby case (section 2.3). The union government
increases the provision of the global public good and sets the provision of the local public goods
according to the equilibrium (weighted-average) fraction of the population that is organized, λU.
To ﬁnd the fraction of the union population that becomes organized in the second stage we
again need to rank groups in ascending order of their ﬁxed cost. Remember that we did this for
each region separately in section 3.1. By construction, the functions FA(λ) and FB(λ) represent
the inverse of a cummulative distribution function. For a given ﬁxed cost, c ∈ <+, the function
λi(c)=F−1
i (c) represents the fraction of groups in region i with a ﬁxed cost less than or equal to








Then, by construction, the function FU always falls between the functions FA and FB.T h e
group at position λU will choose to become organized if the following condition is satisﬁed.
NB(λU)=f WL (λU) − f WN (λU) − e C (λU) >F U(λU)
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U(λ) > 0 by construction. Then it can be
shown that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium to the entry game and it is the one that satisﬁes










B.S i n c et h eNB schedule is the
same under separation as under political union and since the FU schedule lies everywhere between
the FA and the FB schedules, we can conclude that b λ
S
B < b λU < b λ
S
A (refer to ﬁgure 4).
The proportion of the population that becomes organized in each region is uniquely determined
and more (less) groups become organized in the richer (poorer) country relative to the separation
case. The equilibrium condition essentially determines a cut-oﬀ level of the ﬁxed cost. Any group
with a ﬁxed cost lower than this cutoﬀ becomes organized. Since the ﬁxed cost is lower for the
rich country relative to the separation case, more groups become organized in the case of political
union.
We have now established the results of the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (i) More lobbies are formed in the rich country under political union than under
political separation. (ii) Less lobbies are formed in the poor country under political union than
under political separation. (iii) Both organized and non-organized groups in the richer country
receive more of the targeted public good under union than under separation. (iv) Both organized
and non-organized groups in the poorer country receive less of the targeted public good under union
than under separation.
Proposition 6 replaces proposition 5 in the main text. A subtle distinction is that this time
the reduction in competition from the perspective of country A comes about from the political
integration with a country where groups face a higher cost of organization rather than from the
integration with a less organized population. The discussion on welfare, however, is the same as in
section 3.3.
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(000's) million PPS PPS (EU15 = 100) Associations
Bulgaria BG 8170 51400 28 20
Cyprus CY 671 12900 85 4
Czech Republic CZ 10272 135500 58 25
Estonia EE 1436 12400 38 13
Hungary HU 10024 115100 51 15
Latvia LV 2417 15900 29 3
Lithuania LT 3696 27600 33 7
Malta MT 390 4900 55 10
Poland PL 38649 342100 39 11
Romania RO 22443 117300 23 3
Slovakia SK 5401 58100 48 3
Slovenia SI 1989 31000 69 16
Turkey TR 65303 397500 27 40
Total 170861 1321700 34 170
EU vs Candidates
EU 15 EU15 376455 8525000 100 1396
All Candidates 170861 1321700 34 170
Candidates less Turkey 105558 924200 39 130
Source: Population and GDP figures, Eurostat Yearbook, 2002. Trade association figures for the year 1999, Euromonitor.
Figure 1: General Statistics for the EU and Candidate Countries
32
Daniel Brou and Michele Ruta










Figure 2: Equilibrium Lobby Formation Under Separation
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Lobby Formation Under Political Union
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Lobby Formation Under Political Union (Alternative Timing)
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